Civil Commitment of Pregnant Women as a Means of
Protecting Fetuses from Maternal Drug and Alcohol Abuse

Dana S. Hardy
University of New Mexico School of Law
Bioethics Fall 1998

School of Law Librnry
The University of New tdexico
1117 Stanford Drive, N.E.
Albuquerque. New Mexico 87191.1.*4f

I.

Introduction
During recent years, courts and legislatures have

expanded the legal rights of fetuses, which historically
were treated as part of the woman carrying them.'

This

expansion of fetal rights has often resulted in conflict
between the rights of the fetus and the rights of the woman
carrying it.

While concern for the health of fetuses is

important to the health of our society, the maternal-fetal
conflict is often unnecessary, as the health interests of
fetuses could be more effectively promoted in ways that
would not conflict with the interests of the mother.

In

this paper I will specifically address whether civil
commitment statutes should be used to prevent pregnant
women from using drugs and alcohol during pregnancy.
Because the use of civil commitment statutes for this
purpose would exacerbate the maternal-fetal conflict, and
fetal health could be better promoted in other ways, I
conclude that they should not.

11. Statement of the Problem

Over the past decade, a great deal of national
attention has been focused on the problems caused by
maternal drug use during pregnancy.

Indeed, the number of

infants who are exposed to illegal drugs in utero is
staggering.

In some areas of the country, the rate of

newborn addiction has quadrupled since 1985.' Hospitals in
these areas estimate that over twenty percent of the babies
born in their facilities have been exposed to drugs in
utero.3

Drug use during pregnancy causes numerous problems

for exposed newborns, including low birthweight, low IQ
scores, and physical abnormalities.4
While the problems caused by illegal drug use during
pregnancy are tremendous, use of legal drugs can cause even
greater problems.

Fetal alcohol syndrome is one of the top

three known causes of mental retardation, affecting nearly
5000 infants each year.'

Fetal alcohol effects, a less

severe version of fetal alcohol syndrome, affects

Dawn E. Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95
Yale L. J. 599 (1986).
See Page Mcguire Linden, Drug Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call for
Increased Social Responsibility, 4 Am. U. J. Gender s. L. 105, 106
(1995),discussing the serious problems that are caused by illegal drug
use during pregnancy.
Id.
See Barry Zuckerman et al., Effects of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine
Use on Fetal Growth, 320 New Eng. J. Med. 762-68 (1989).
See David F. Chavkin, "For Their Own Good": Civil Commitment of
Alcohol and Drug-Dependant Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 224, 234
(1992),stating that fetal alcohol syndrome is one of the top three
causes of birth defects accompanying mental retardation.

approximately 36,000 babies each year.6

The American

Medical Association has determined that there is no safe
dose of alcohol during pregnancy, and that total abstinence
is the only way to ensure that a fetus will not be harmed
by exposure to alcohol.7

Tobacco use during pregnancy and

consumption of certain prescription and over the counter
drugs can also cause problems for fetuses.8
Children who were exposed to drugs or alcohol in utero
create tremendous costs for society. They often need
additional medical attention, and they frequently require
special education because they suffer from learning
di~abi1itie.s.~Several solutions have been proposed to
limit drug or alcohol abuse during pregnancy.

Some courts

have allowed children to bring civil suits against their
mother for her behavior during pregnancy. lo

In some states

prosecutors have charged women with abusing a fetus under
child abuse and neglect laws, and in others women have been
Id.
See id., citing American Medical Assrn A.M.A., Council of Sci. Aff.,
Fetal Effects of Maternal Alcohol Abuse (June 1989).
See Chavkin supra note 5 at 230-31. Smoking during pregnancy often
causes low birthweight, and many other drugs can have a teratogenic
affect if they cross the placenta.
See Linden, supra note 1 at 106, stating that neonatal care for an
infant exposed to cocaine costs an average of $5,000 more than neonatal
care for an infant who was not exposed to drugs in utero. Linden also
states that special education for one Boston student who was exposed to
drugs cost $13,000 per year, while education for a non-exposed child
cost $5,000 per year. Id. at 109.
lo A Michigan court has held that a child could sue his mother for
taking tetracycline, an antibiotic, during pregnancy. The tetracycline

'

'

civilly committed during pregnancy. 11 Civil commitment poses
important and interesting issues for both women and their
children because in theory it provides treatment for the
mother while protecting the fetus.

111.

Overview:

Different Types of Commitment Statutes

Historically, civil commitment statutes have been used
to involuntarily hospitalize people who are dangerous to
themselves or others.''

The statutes are designed to

protect society from people who are ill while
simultaneously providing treatment for those individuals.13
Civil Commitment statutes are justified by the parens
patrie power, which permits state action to protect people
who are unable to care for themselves, and by a state's
police power, which permits state action to protect society
from dangerous individuals.l 4

Civil commitment has

generated ongoing controversy because of the uncertainty
about the effectiveness of forced treatment, the question
of whether a person should have the right to refuse

caused d i s c o l o r a t i o n o f t h e c h i l d ' s t e e t h . Grodin v. Grodin, 301
N.W.2d 869 (Mich. C t . App. 1980).
l1 S e e Dawn Johnsen, Shared I n t e r e s t s : Promoting Healthy B i r t h s Without
S a c r i f i c i n g Women's L i b e r t y , 4 3 Hastings L.J. 569, 570 (1992).
See James M . W i l t o n , Compelled H o s p i t a l i z a t i o n and Treatment During
Pregnancy: Mental Health S t a t u t e s a s Models f o r L e g i s l a t i o n t o P r o t e c t
Children from Prenatal Drug and Alcohol Exposure, 25 Fam. L.Q. 149, 162

(1991).
Linden, supra n o t e 1 a t 120.

'l

" Id.

treatment, and because of the deprivation of freedom
involved.15 While most civil commitment statutes originally
applied only to people with mental health problems, a
majority of states now allow civil commitment of drug and
alcohol dependant individuals.16
While civil commitment is a long accepted practice in
the mental health arena, in the last decade it has been
increasingly advocated as a means of treatment for drug
abuse.17

As concern for the rights of women and their

fetuses escalates,'"t

is likely that civil commitment

statutes will be applied to pregnant women more frequently
in the future. There are three types of civil commitment
statutes in use today, and arguably, any of them could be
used to commit pregnant women.lg The first type expressly
applies only to people with mental disabilities. States
that apply this type of statute generally recognize drug

" S e e Sandra Anderson Garcia, Drug Addiction and Mother/Child Welfare,
13 J. Legal Med. 129, 175 (1992).
l6 See id., stating that civil commitment statutes in approximately 34
states specifically allow commitment of alcoholics, and statutes in 37
states expressly allow commitment of drug addicts.
" See id., discussing the White House's
September 1989 National Drug
Control Strategy, which advocated exploration of ways to increase the
use of civil commitment for drug treatment.
'' See Johnsen, supra note 11 at 569, stating that "a new strand of
legal and public policy issues recently has emerged that
threatens American women's reproductive freedom and other fundamental
liberties." Johnsen argues that the government has increasingly
imposed restrictions on pregnant women to promote the health of the
fetuses that they carry.
l9 See Chavkin, supra note 5 at 250.

...

and alcohol abuse as mental disabilitie~.'~The second type
of statute expressly applies to people who abuse drugs or
alcoh01.'~

The third type applies specifically to the

commitment of pregnant women who abuse drugs or alcohol.22
Currently only one state, Minnesota, has a civil commitment
statute that explicitly authorizes commitment of drugdependant pregnant women.23

IV. A fetus as an "Other Person"
While theoretically civil commitment statutes could be
used to commit pregnant women who abuse drugs or alcohol,
they have been used infrequently for this purpose. 24

There

may be several explanations for the fact that civil
commitment statutes have been used infrequently for this
purpose. It is possible that society has not wanted to
create a conflict between the rights of a fetus and the
rights of the woman who carries it.

This makes sense in

light of the fact that it would be detrimental to a fetus
to create a conflict between a fetus and its mother, when
See id.
See id.
22 See id.
"See Linden, supra note 1 at 122. Minnesota also requires physicians
to test pregnant women for drug use when drug use is suspected. A
physician is required to report a positive toxicology test to the local
welfare agency. Id.
' w i l e civil commitment statutes have been widely used to commit the
mentally ill, and for drug and alcohol dependent individuals in recent
20

the fetus is completely dependent on its mother for its
care.

It is also possible that until recently, society has

not wanted to acknowledge that women could inadequately
care for their unborn children. Women have traditionally
been expected to nurture their children, protect virtue,
and instill values in their offspring,25 and society may not
have wanted to acknowledge that women were not meeting
these expectations.

It is also likely that the drastic

improvement in medical technology has caused society to
rethink its definition of 'pers~nhood."~~
Whatever the reason behind society's failure to use
civil commitment statutes to regulate pregnancy, the
practical explanation seems to be that it is unclear
whether a fetus may be defined as an 'other"

for purposes

of civil commitment statutes, which usually allow
commitment only when a person is dangerous to herself or
others.

Determining whether a fetus is an "other" is a

complex task with tremendous implications. Historically, a
fetus was considered to be part of the women who carried

decades, there is very little discussion of their specific application
to pregnant women. See generally Chavkin, supra note 4.
See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the
Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting
to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Ohio St. L.J.
1205, 1211 (1992). stating that social problems have been blamed on
women because they have failed to instill virtue in their families.
2 6 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), holding that viability, not trimesters, should be used
to determine when a woman has the right to terminate a pregnancy.

it, and it had no legal rights as a separate entity.27
Recently, however, courts and legislatures have granted
fetuses rights that were traditionally enjoyed only by born
human beings.28
Both criminal law and tort law have expanded fetal
rights in recent years.2 9 Traditionally, any rights that a
fetus did have were contingent upon live birth.

For

example, a born child that was injured in utero could
assert a tort action for prenatal injuries.30

The live

birth requirement has been increasingly eroded. Many
states now recognize wrongful death actions when a fetus
dies in ~tero.~' State legislatures have also defined a
fetus as a person for purposes of homicide and assault

statute^.^' In these states, live birth is not a
requirement for a person to be sued under tort law or
charged under criminal law for injuring a fetus.
Courts have also begun to decide that fetuses are
people for purposes of statutes that traditionally applied
only to born human beings even when there is no indication
that the legislature intended for the statutes to apply to

'' Johnson,

supra note 1 at 599. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U . S . 113,
162 (19731, stating that "the unborn have never been recognized in the
law as persons in the whole sense."
See Johnson, supra note 1 at 599.
2 9 See id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
See id.
See Linden, supra note 2 at 110.

''

fetuses.

In e x . r e l . Angela v. Kruzicki,3 3 the Wisconsin

Court of Appeals decided that a fetus was a child for
purposes of the child protective custody statute.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has also
held that a fetus should be considered a person under the
state's child abuse statutes.34 Given the recent expansion
of fetal rights under child abuse statutes, it seems likely
that courts and legislatures will increasingly begin to
define a fetus as an "other" for purposes of civil
commitment statutes.
an 'other"

Changing the historical definition of

under the statutes may facilitate the use of

civil commitment for the protection of fetuses.

V.

Constitutional Rights of the Mother

A.

The Right to Privacy

There are numerous legal concerns involved in using
civil commitment statutes to protect fetuses from their
mother's drug an alcohol use.

Critics of civil commitment

argue that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to
privacy.

The Supreme Court has determined that the

541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
overturned Kruzicki on appeal, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997), but the
Court of Appeal's decision is indicative of the current trend in
recognizing fetal rights.
3 4 See S t a t e v. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d
777 (S.C. 1997), holding that a
pregnant woman could be charged under child abuse statute for substance
abuse during pregnancy.
33

Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from interfering
with fundamental rights that are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."35 The Court has stated that the right
to privacy is founded on the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty interests.36
In Roe v. Wade,37 the Supreme Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy prohibited a state
from criminalizing abortion during the first trimester.38
The Court recognized that a woman does not have an absolute
right to an abortion, stating that at some point during a
pregnancy the staters interest in protecting health and
life outweighs a woman's
pregnancy.39

interest in terminating a

The Court determined that the state could

regulate abortion subsequent to the first trimester, and
that a state could prohibit abortion after viability.4 0
It is arguable whether civil commitment, like state
prohibition of abortion during the first trimester,
violates a woman's Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy.4 1
Privacy rights generally prohibit the government from
interfering with a person's independence to make certain

35

36
37
38
39
'O

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151 (1973)
See id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 154.
Id.at 163.
See, e.g. Johnson, supra note 1 at 614.

types of decisions that affect the course of one's life.42
Decisions relating to procreation and pregnancy are
undoubtedly protected by the right to privacy.

The Supreme

Court has stated that the right to privacy protects "the
right of the individual

...

to be free from unwarranted

governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a

Laws that interfere with the right to privacy

must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.44
While it is clear that the right to privacy protects
decisions relating to a woman's

choice to use contraception

or terminate a pregnancy, it does not seem that this right
would prohibit the state from using civil commitment to
protect a fetus.45 Drug or alcohol abuse during pregnancy
is fundamentally different from a woman's right to choose
whether or not to have a child. The state's interest in
ensuring that infants who are born are born healthy may be

Id. at 581.
Eisenstad v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). the court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy prohibited a state infringing upon a woman's
right to contraception.
" See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1973), stating that a law that infringes upon a fundamental liberty
must be justified by a compelling state interest.
4 5 See Wilton, supra note 12 at 156, stating that a woman's
constitutional right to make reproductive choices should not prohibit
the state from intervening to prevent drug and alcohol abuse during
pregnancy.
"
"

much more compelling than ensuring that every fetus is
born.46 This is especially true in light of the fact that
in Roe, the Court recognized the state's interest in
protecting potential life.47

B.

The Liberty Interest of the Mother

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,48 the Supreme Court
refined its holding in Roe by deciding that viability,
rather than trimesters, should be used to determine when a
woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy.4 9

One reason

that the court determined that the trimester framework
should not be followed was that it "undervalued the state's
interest in potential life.""

In Casey the Court

repeatedly emphasized the state's interest in protecting
life.51 The Court held that a state can regulate the right
to an abortion prior to viability as long as the regulation
does not impose an 'undue
C.

46

47

burden" on the woman. 52

The Right to Bodily Integrity

See id.

Id.at 162.

'' 5 0 5

U . S . 8 3 3 (1992).
Id.at 8 7 0 .
Id. at 8 7 3 .
51
See id. at 8 7 3 - 8 7 5 .
52 See id. at 8 7 3
The court stated that an "undue burden" is a
"substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The
court determined that the Pennsylvania statute's parental consent
provision, a 24 hour waiting period requirement, and a provision for
the dissemination of information about the condition of the fetus did
not impose an undue burden upon a woman. The court found that the
statute's spousal notification requirement did constitute an undue
burden.

Critics of civil commitment have also alleged that it
violates a woman's Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily
integrity.53 The Supreme Court has stated that 'no

right is

held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded under the
common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person."54 Like the right
of privacy, the right to bodily integrity is not absolute.
Rather, the state's interest in infringing upon the right
must be balanced against the individual's interest in
remaining free from intrusion.55

Factors that are

considered when balancing the staters interest against the
individual's interest include 1) the connection between the
intervention sought and the state interest invoked to
justify it; 2) the existence of less restrictive
alternatives; 3) the intrusiveness of the intervention; 4)
whether the individual benefits from the intervention, and
5) whether the intervention is necessary to protect third

persons.5 6 Courts have held that the public interest in

supra n o t e 11 a t 582.
Union P a c i f i c Railroad v. Botsford, 141 U . S . 250, 251 ( 1 8 9 1 ) , holding
t h a t a t r i a l court could not order a p l a i n t i f f t o submit t o s u r g i c a l
examination t o determine t h e e x t e n t o f h i s i n j u r i e s .
55 See Wilton, supra note 12 a t 158.
56 Id. a t 158-159.
53
54

See Johnson,

protecting life and public health can outweigh an
individual's liberty interest.51
In many cases, using civil commitment statutes to
protect fetuses from drug and alcohol abuse would meet this
test.

Arguably, the state has a compelling interest in

protecting fetuses from drug and alcohol exposure, in some
cases there may not be any less restrictive alternatives
available, and theoretically the mother would benefit from
the commitment.

There is no doubt that involuntary drug

testing and hospitalization are major intrusions upon a
person's bodily integrity, but in actuality they may be
less intrusive than intervention that has been authorized
in other cases for the protection of fetuses.58 Given that
many of the factors weigh in the state's favor, it does not
seem that the right to bodily integrity would prohibit a
state from using civil commitment to protect a fetus from
maternal drug or alcohol abuse.59
D.

''

Equal Protection Concerns

See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (19051, h o l d i n g t h a t a
s t a t e could r e q u i r e v a c c i n a t i o n s f o r smallpox o v e r r e l i g i o u s
objections.
C o u r t s have i n c r e a s i n g l y r e q u i r e d women t o undergo s u r g i c a l
procedures f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e f e t u s a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l .
See e . g .
J e f f e r s o n v. G r i f f i n S p a l d i n g County Hosp. v. Anderson, 274 S.E.2d 457
( 1 9 8 1 ) , h o l d i n g t h a t a woman c o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o submit t o a c e s a r e a n
s e c t i o n f o r t h e h e a l t h o f t h e f e t u s even when s h e o b j e c t e d t o s u r g e r y
f o r r e l i g i o u s reasons.
See Wilton, s u p r a n o t e 1 2 a t 160, s t a t i n g t h a t c i v i l commitment o f
pregnant women would n o t v i o l a t e t h e r i g h t t o b o d i l y i n t e g r i t y i f i t i s
used c o r r e c t l y .

''

Precedent also indicates that the use of civil
commitment statutes to protect fetuses from maternal drug
or alcohol abuse would not violate the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Even though only women

can become pregnant, and therefore, pregnancy based legal
distinctions would apply only to women, the Supreme Court

'
pregnancy based
held in Geduldig v. ~ i e l l o ~that
distinctions do not necessarily amount to sex
discrimination.

The Court stated that "while it is true

that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification

...

n 62

Because "pregnancy discrimination" does not
automatically constitute sex discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment, laws that discriminate on the basis
of pregnancy are subject only to rational basis scrutiny.63

417 U.S. 484 (1974).
See id. at 2492. In Geduldig, a woman challenged California's
disability insurance program, which excluded benefits for pregnant
women, under the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the
statute discriminated against pregnant people, not against women in
general. See id. at 2491, stating that under the program "there is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not." Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas, and Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion in
which he argued that pregnancy-based discrimination did amount to sex
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it should be
subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 2494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(k) (1988),
only prohibits pregnancy discrimination by employers. Thus, it would
not prohibit pregnancy-based civil comnitment.
Id. at 2492 n. 20.
63 See id. at 2491, stating that unless a law creates a suspect class,
it must only be rationally supportable.
'O

''

Given the state's interest in protecting fetuses from harm,
it would be rather simple for the government to argue that
pregnancy-based civil commitment for the protection of
fetuses is rationally supportable.64 This is especially the
case where it is clear that commitment would protect the
fetus from further harm.
If Geduldig was overruled, and pregnancy-based
discrimination was found to constitute sex discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment, civil commitment of
pregnant women would be subject to intermediate scrutiny.65
In order to show that a law that creates sex-based
classifications is justified under intermediate scrutiny,
the government must show that the classifications serve
important governmental objectives, and that the law is
substantially related to the achievement of those

objective^.^^

It is not clear that pregnancy-based civil

commitment would be invalid under this test. The state has
a major financial interest in protecting fetuses from drug
and alcohol exposure, and civil commitment of pregnant
women would be substantially related to this goal.
Whether civil commitment of pregnant women is subject
to rational basis or intermediate scrutiny, it would most

64
65

66

See Johnson, supra n o t e 11 a t 5 8 6
See Craig v. Boren, 4 2 9 U.S. 190 ( 1 9 7 6 ) .
See id. a t 1 9 7 .

likely be valid under the Equal Protection Clause. Given
the Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based
classifications, it is extremely unlikely that it would
ever apply strict scrutiny to pregnancy-based
~lassifications.~'
As one critic of civil commitment has
stated, "absent the protection of strict scrutiny, there is
no logical stopping point to the kinds of personal
decisions by women that could be second guessed by zealous
prosecutors or

. . . j~dges."~'

VI. Balancing the Constitutional Rights of the Mother with
the Interests of the Fetus
It is not clear whether the Fourteenth Amendment
rights to privacy, liberty, or bodily integrity provide
different protections, or whether the protections are in
actuality the same.

It seems that both the rights to

privacy and bodily integrity are couched in the general
Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty.6g Despite the Court's
discussions of the rights as though they are distinct, the

It is unclear why the Court has declined to apply strict scrutiny to
sex-based classifications. In a decision that applied intermediate
scrutiny to a sex-based classification, the Court stated, "we need not
decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently
suspect."
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982).
" Johnson, supra note 11 at 586.
"See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153,statingthat the right to privacy is based on the FourteenIh
Amendment's protection of liberty interests,and Witon, supra note 11 at 156,stating that the right to
bodily integrity is part of the right to privacy.
"

general test seems to be that the state's interest in
protecting the fetus must be weighed against the mother's
rights interests. Proponents of civil commitment argue
that the state's interests outweigh the mother's, and
critics argue that the mother's interests outweigh the
state's.
Despite the decisions in Roe and Casey that a woman
does have the right to terminate her pregnancy prior to
viability, the cases also recognize that the state has a
"profound interest" in protecting life.

Given this

interest, it does not seem that the mother's constitutional
rights would impose limits on a state's ability to civilly
commit women for drug or alcohol use during pregnancy,
especially subsequent to viability. It is not clear under
Roe or Casey whether the state could commit a woman prior
to viability, although language in Casey indicates that
this may be a possibility.71
Considering the cost to society of caring for children
who were exposed to drugs and alcohol in utero, the state
has a tremendous interest in protecting fetuses that will

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, stating that the state has a substantial
interest in protecting human life, and that not all regulations are
unwarranted.
' O

"

be carried to term.7 2

Under Roe it seems that civil

commitment subsequent to viability would not violate the

our tee nth Amendment

right to privacy because at viability,

the state's interest outweighs even a woman's interest in
choosing to terminate a pregnancy.

Because drug and

alcohol damage to a fetus can be caused before viability,
the government could even have a compelling interest in
protecting fetuses through civil commitment prior to
viability. 73

In many instances, especially in cases of

alcohol abuse, intervention prior to viability may be even
more necessary than intervention after viability.74
Considering all of these factors, it is not clear that
the constitutional rights of the mother would preclude the
state from using civil commitment to protect fetuses from
maternal drug or alcohol abuse.

Drug and alcohol abuse

during pregnancy may not be protected by any constitutional
right, and even if they are, the state may have a
compelling interest in protecting fetuses from such
exposure.

'' See id., stating that the balance between the interests of the state
and the mother in the context of "fetal health legislation" will be
different from the balance struck in the context of abortion statutes.
l 3 See id.
'' See id. at 151, stating that there is conflicting medical evidence as
to the stage of pregnancy when alcohol exposure is the most dangerous
for a fetus. Some evidence shows that the time of conception is the
most critical. Id.

VIII.

Policy Arguments
In spite of the fact that there may be no

constitutional bar against using civil commitment for the
protection of fetuses, it would be unwise as a policy
matter to use it for this purpose.

Several organizations,

including the American Medical Association, have officially
opposed the use of civil commitment for the protection of
fetuses from maternal drug or alcohol abuse.75

There are

many reasons why civil commitment should not be used for
the protection of fetuses.
Proponents of the use of civil commitment for the
protection of fetuses argue that it is the best way for the
state to protect a fetus while also protecting the
interests of the mother.16

This argument is based on the

idea that civil commitment provides treatment for the
mother while simultaneously protecting the fetus.l7

This

argument has merit, as civil commitment may be a more
humane way to deal with maternal drug or alcohol abuse than
prosecution under child abuse laws. Unlike prosecution for
maternal drug or alcohol abuse under child abuse laws,
civil commitment is designed to treat the person committed,

l5

See Johnson, supra note 11 at 603.
Wilton, supra note 12 at 167.
See generally id.

76 See
77

not to punish them." Thus, theoretically it could help both
the mother and the fetus at the same time.

In spite of the

fact that civil commitment may be a more appropriate way to
address maternal drug and alcohol abuse than criminal
prosecution, policy arguments against its use outweigh the
arguments in its favor.
Involuntarily committing pregnant women in order to
protect fetuses is inappropriate given that voluntary
treatment for drug and alcohol abuse is often not available
to pregnant women.79 One survey found that in 1989,
government funded treatment centers turned away 250,000
pregnant women who were voluntarily seeking treatment.

1n

fact, one women who was criminally prosecuted for
"delivering" drugs to her infant through the umbilical cord
attempted to find treatment during her pregnancy and was
turned away."

Many treatment centers do not accept

pregnant women because of the high risk involved in drug
affected pregnancies.8 2
It does not make sense to allow women to be
involuntarily committed when there are very few facilities

78
79

See id.

See Linden, supra note 2 at 131.
See id., citing Michele Magar, The Sins o f the Mothers, Student Law.,
Sept. 1991 at 30, 34 (discussing a National Association of State
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors survey).
See id. at 132.
See id. n. 198.

that offer voluntary treatment.

Involuntary commitment

would be unnecessary in many cases if women were able to
seek voluntary treatment.

Subjecting women who would seek

voluntary treatment to involuntary commitment is unfair to
them, and it unnecessarily increases the maternal-fetal
conflict.
Another problem with the use of involuntary civil
commitment is that women may avoid seeking prenatal care if
they fear that their drug or alcohol use will be detected
and they will be committed as a result.83

Undoubtedly,

civil commitment would serve as a tremendous threat to
pregnant women.

Commitment would take away a woman's

liberty, and it would also affect her ability to take care
of her other children if she has them.

The few commitment

facilities that do accept pregnant women generally do not
provide any type of child care.84 For a single, working
mother, the threat of commitment could be enough to deter
her from seeking prenatal care altogether. Surely it is not
in the interest of fetuses for their mothers to avoid
prenatal care.

83 See e.g.
id. at 134. See also Johnson, supra note 11 at 603, stating
that the AMA is concerned with special prosecutions of pregnant women
because it will discourage them from seeking prenatal care.
See id. at 133, stating that treatment facilities cater to males
rather than females, and that they rarely provide child care.

''

Civil Commitment of pregnant women is also
inappropriate because commitment facilities are generally
not equipped to deal with pregnancies at all, let alone the
high-risk pregnancies that often result from drug or
alcohol abuse."

The reality of an involuntary civil

commitment system may consist of confinement in a prison
with little or no access to prenatal care.86

Such

confinement would be likely to result in an inadequate
diet, improper nutrition, and insufficient exercise.87

It

is difficult to discern how this would promote the health
of children.

It seems unlikely that involuntary treatment

centers would provide adequate facilities when society has
refused to fund adequate voluntary treatment centers for
pregnant women.
Yet another difficulty with using civil commitment to
protect fetuses is that women may choose abortion over
civil commitment. Legally, under Roe and Casey, the
government may intervene in a pregnancy to protect the
fetus.

Given the interest that the government has in

protecting the health of a fetus that will be carried to
term, the state could have a compelling interest in
commitment prior to viability.
B5

See Chavkin, supra n o t e a t 263.

e6

Id.

Commitment prior to

viability may be necessary because drug and alcohol
exposure can cause a great deal of damage to a fetus before
the fetus is viable." Under Casey, the government cannot
prohibit a woman from terminating a pregnancy prior to
viability."

It seems logical that a woman threatened with

civil commitment could choose to have an abortion in order
to avoid losing her freedom or her ability to care for
other children.
If the state's interest in protecting a fetus was
found to be sufficient to allow commitment only subsequent
to viability, commitment would often be useless. Because a
great deal of damage to a fetus can be caused prior to
viability, commitment after a fetus is viable could be only
marginally helpful. 90
beneficial at all.

In some cases it may not be

It does not make sense to commit women

prior to viability, when they may choose abortion over
commitment, and it may not protect the health of the fetus
to commit them after viability.

Thus, involuntary

commitment at any point during a pregnancy may not be an
effective way to promote fetal health.

See id., stating that prison health experts warn that prisons are
extremely deficient in meeting the needs of pregnant women.
See Chavkin, supra note at 149-153.
8 9 See Casey at 870.
See Chavkin, supra note at 234, stating that there is no safe time to
drink during pregnancy.

Another argument against civil commitment is that it
may result in extensive government regulation of the
choices that pregnant women make. Almost any action that a
pregnant woman takes has some impact on the fetus that she
carries.91 A great deal of legal conduct may be dangerous
to a fetus.

For example, smoking, eating an inadequate

diet, taking prescription medication, and exposure to
infectious diseases can have an adverse impact on a fetus. 92
It is not clear that civil commitment for the protection of
fetuses would be used only in cases of drug or alcohol
abuse.

This is especially the case when certain legal

activities may pose even more risk to a fetus than drug or
alcohol abuse.93 Such regulation of women's choices would
in effect result in 'pregnancy police," and it would
substantially infringe upon the freedom and dignity of
women.

IX. Conclusion

See Johnson, supra note 1 at 606.
See id. at 606. Johnson states that "If the current trend in fetal
rights continues, pregnant women would live in constant fear that any
accident or 'error' in judgment could be deemed 'unacceptable' and
become the basis for a criminal prosecution by the state or a civil
suit by a disenchanted husband or relative." Id. at 607.
93 For example, maternal negligence that results in a car accident could
cause far more damage to a fetus than drug or alcohol abuse. Also,
fetal exposure to certain prescription drugs is extremely dangerous.
See, e.g., id. at 606. See also Garcia, supra note 15 at 134, stating
that certain legal drugs can cause as much damage to a fetus as illegal
drugs.
91
92

In conclusion, the policy arguments against using
civil commitment for the protection of fetuses are stronger
than the arguments in its favor.

Civil commitment is not

an effective way to promote fetal health or the interests
of women.

It may discourage women from seeking prenatal

care, and it may even encourage them to terminate their
pregnancies.

It is also likely that civil commitment

facilities will not be equipped to meet the needs of
pregnant women. Involuntary civil commitment is especially
unjust in light of the fact that voluntary commitment is
generally unavailable for pregnant women.
Rather then focusing on solutions that exacerbate the
fetal-maternal conflict, like involuntary civil commitment,
both fetal health and the interests of women would be
better served by focusing on cooperative solutions. Many
women who are abusers of drugs or alcohol want to have
healthy pregnan~ies.'~ They face obstacles such as poor
information, lack of health insurance, poverty, and the
failure of treatment programs to accept pregnant women at
It would be more beneficial for women and their
children for society to fund voluntary commitment programs,
prenatal care, and education programs than to fund

'' See
95

Johnson, supra note 11 at 5 7 4 .

See id.

26

involuntary civil commitment.g6 These types of programs
would be more effective than involuntary civil commitment,
and they would promote fetal health while protecting the
interests of women.

See Linden, supra note 2 at 137, discussing successful and cost
effective voluntary treatment programs for pregnant women.
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